Inherent Powers of Federal Courts: Procedural Rules

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Limitations to the Rule Making Power

The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions. But no such rule “can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.” This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.” 9 Footnote
Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635, 636 (1924) . It is not for the Supreme Court to prescribe how the discretion vested in a Court of Appeals should be exercised. As long as the latter court keeps within the bounds of judicial discretion, its action is not reviewable. In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521 (1956) . As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.10 Footnote
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915) ; Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844) . See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (court of appeal rule conditioning appeal on having filed with the district court timely objections to a master's report). In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956) , the Court, citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) , asserted that this supervisory power extends to policing the requirements of the Court's rules with respect to the law enforcement practices of federal agents. But compare United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) .

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.11 Footnote
Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888) ; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884) ; Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866) . Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.12 Footnote
Eberly v. Moore, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 147 (1861) ; Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919) . While the Court has not “precisely delineated the outer boundaries” of a federal court’s inherent powers to manage its own internal affairs, the Court has recognized two limits on the exercise of such authority.13 Footnote
See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15-458, slip op. at 4 (2016) . First, a court, in exercising its inherent powers over its own processes, must act reasonably in response to a specific problem or issue “confronting the court’s fair administration of justice.” 14 Footnote
Id. at 4–5 . Second, any exercise of an inherent power cannot conflict with any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power as contained in a statute or rule, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Footnote
Id. at 4 . In applying these two standards, the Court has recognized that a district court, as an exercise of its inherent powers, can in limited circumstances rescind an order to discharge a jury and recall that jury in a civil case.16 Footnote
Id. at 5–7 (acknowledging that while it is “reasonable” to allow a jury to reconvene after a formal discharge to correct an error and while such an exercise of authority does not conflict with a rule or statute, the exercise of the inherent power to rescind a discharge order needs to be “carefully circumscribed” to guarantee the existence of an impartial jury); see also id. at 9–10 (holding that a court, in exercising an inherent power to rescind a discharge order, must consider, among other factors, (1) the length of delay between discharge and recall; (2) whether jurors have spoken to anyone after discharge; (3) any reaction to the verdict in the courtroom; and (4) any access jurors may have had to outside materials after discharge). The rule provided in Dietz extends only to civil cases, as additional constitutional concerns—namely, the attachment of the double jeopardy bar—may arise if a court were to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case. See id. at 10 . The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that federal courts possess the inherent power to control other aspects of regulating internal court proceedings, including having the inherent power to (1) hear a motion in limine;17 Footnote
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) . A motion in limine is a preliminary motion resolved by a court prior to trial and generally regards the admissibility of evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 1171 (10th ed. 2014). (2) dismiss a case for the convenience of the parties or witnesses because of the availability of an alternative forum;18 Footnote
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947) . This doctrine is called forum non conveniens. See Black's Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014) (defining forum non conveniens as the “doctrine that an appropriate forum — even though competent under the law — may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place.” ). and (3) stay proceedings pending the resolution of parallel actions in other courts.19 Footnote
See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) . The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.20 Footnote
Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 458 (1904) . Nonetheless, while the exercise of an inherent power can, at times, allow for departures from even long-established, judicially crafted common law rules,21 Footnote
See Dietz , slip op. at 11 (assuming that, even if courts at common law lacked the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order, a court’s exercise of its inherent powers can depart from the common law). The term “common law” refers to the body of English law that was “adopted as the law of the American colonies and supplemented with local enactments and judgments.” See Black's Law Dictionary 334 (10th ed. 2014). courts are not “generally free to discover new inherent powers that are contrary to civil practice as recognized in the common laws.” 22 Footnote
See Dietz , slip op. at 12 .

Footnotes 1 Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924) . 2 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) . 3 106 U.S. 272, 280 (1882) . 4 See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960) , holding that a federal district court, sitting in admiralty, has no inherent power, independent of any statute or the Supreme Court's Admiralty Rules, to order the taking of deposition for the purpose of discovery. See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) , in which the Court found statutory authority in the “All Writs Statute” for a habeas corpus court to propound interrogatories. 5 In the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, and contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 , Congress, in authorizing promulgation of rules of civil procedure, reserved the power to examine and override or amend rules proposed pursuant to the act which it found to be contrary to its legislative policy. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1941) . Congress also has authorized promulgation of rules of criminal procedure, habeas , evidence, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate procedure. See Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supraat 533-543 (discussing development of rules and citing secondary authority). Congress in the 1970s disagreed with the direction of proposed rules of evidence and of habeas practice, and, first postponing their effectiveness, enacted revised rules. Pub. L. No. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974); Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976). On this and other actions, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra. 6 However, the abolition of old rights and the creation of new ones in the course of litigation conducted in conformance with these judicially prescribed federal rules has been sustained as against the contention of a violation of substantive rights. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) . 7 Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589–590 (1941) . 8 Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) . 9 Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635, 636 (1924) . It is not for the Supreme Court to prescribe how the discretion vested in a Court of Appeals should be exercised. As long as the latter court keeps within the bounds of judicial discretion, its action is not reviewable. In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521 (1956) . 10 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915) ; Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844) . See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (court of appeal rule conditioning appeal on having filed with the district court timely objections to a master's report). In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956) , the Court, citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) , asserted that this supervisory power extends to policing the requirements of the Court's rules with respect to the law enforcement practices of federal agents. But compare United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) . 11 Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888) ; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884) ; Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866) . 12 Eberly v. Moore, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 147 (1861) ; Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919) . 13 See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15-458, slip op. at 4 (2016) . 14 Id. at 4–5 . 15 Id. at 4 . 16 Id. at 5–7 (acknowledging that while it is “reasonable” to allow a jury to reconvene after a formal discharge to correct an error and while such an exercise of authority does not conflict with a rule or statute, the exercise of the inherent power to rescind a discharge order needs to be “carefully circumscribed” to guarantee the existence of an impartial jury); see also id. at 9–10 (holding that a court, in exercising an inherent power to rescind a discharge order, must consider, among other factors, (1) the length of delay between discharge and recall; (2) whether jurors have spoken to anyone after discharge; (3) any reaction to the verdict in the courtroom; and (4) any access jurors may have had to outside materials after discharge). The rule provided in Dietz extends only to civil cases, as additional constitutional concerns—namely, the attachment of the double jeopardy bar—may arise if a court were to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case. See id. at 10 . 17 See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) . A motion in limine is a preliminary motion resolved by a court prior to trial and generally regards the admissibility of evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 1171 (10th ed. 2014). 18 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947) . This doctrine is called forum non conveniens. See Black's Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014) (defining forum non conveniens as the “doctrine that an appropriate forum — even though competent under the law — may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place.” ). 19 See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) . 20 Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 458 (1904) . 21 See Dietz , slip op. at 11 (assuming that, even if courts at common law lacked the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order, a court’s exercise of its inherent powers can depart from the common law). The term “common law” refers to the body of English law that was “adopted as the law of the American colonies and supplemented with local enactments and judgments.” See Black's Law Dictionary 334 (10th ed. 2014). 22 See Dietz , slip op. at 12 .

The following state regulations pages link to this page.